

## Democracy and Human Rights in Limited Statehood: SEE Perspective

### *Introduction*

In 1990, when the communist system had begun to change Jon Elster, prominent scholar in the field of transitional justice, launched the article under the title „The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform”.<sup>1</sup> Elster argued that political and economic transformation in Eastern Europe differed from transformation process in Western Europe in two very important points. In Western Europe that modernizing process taking place in slow, graduate and evolutionary patterns over century. In Eastern Europe was deliberately lead by new political elites and simultaneous including simultaneously three transformation processes: political (from dictatorship to democracy), economic (from command economy to market economy) and in some instances governmental (founding or refunding nation-state). Claus Offe, German political scientist defined that theorem as „the dilemma of simultaneity” adding one important note: that theorem does not fir for region of former South-Easte Europe, particularly for the region of former Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> In many senses Claus Offe was right. For the most of post-communist scholars, South East Europe as region exhibiting divergence from the rest of Europe and Central-European countries moving toward fragmentation, implosion of states and great instability in the climate of war, cruielty, violence and fear. That gap threatens and undermine European convergence South East Europe does not belong to optimistic postcommunist narrative which tells us the triumphal story about about the region in which reforms backed on liberal pooltical ideology worked, where democracy is consolidated and „great transformation” completed. On the contrary, the picture is more realistic and even pesimistic. Although, countries in South East/Western Balkan undergo complex transformation and far-reaching change in their political, economic and social transformation, that

<sup>1</sup> J. Elster, „The Neccesity and Impossibliity of Simultaneous Economic and Poltiical reforms”, in Piotr Płoszajski (ed.), *The Philosophy of Social Choice*, Wrasaw, IFIS Publisher, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> C. Offe, „Capitalism by Democatic Design. Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe”, *Social Research*, Vol. 71, No 3, 2004, pp. 505–527.

„window of opportunity” and constitutional chance for redefinition political and collective identity has been in many senses lost. Most of them are still in the midst of contested statehood and serious contestation over collective identity and internal structure of state. Within the broader frame of „Europeanization” this article will assess these complicated processes from the perspective of state-building, democracy and human rights.<sup>3</sup>

### *Legacy*

As regard legacy, social dynamic and the nature of political culture, political transformation of South-East („Europeanization”) has face three negative legacies. First one is war producing very specific fear of disorder; another one is related to very specific form of state and nation building producing fear of communities (identity); and third one is strongly related to belicistic political culture producing very specific form of regimes of fear. „No part of Europe has seen a greater degree of violence in the past decade than former Yugoslavia. The wars and violence leading to the death of ethnic violence was simultaneously deeply political in the sense that it was committed with political goals in mind—such as creation of homogenous nation-state or maintaining political power – and organized by political forces – parties and governments.”<sup>4</sup> War is violent teacher, we have learned from Thucydides.<sup>5</sup>

South-Eastern societies are post-war societies overburden with cyclical destruction of order and legacy of lawlessness.<sup>6</sup> Destruction of legality (order) is most traumatic experience a political community can undergo. When the legality (order) is destroyed, even in the circumstances when the destruction is justifiable on the ground of its weakness and negative traits, the members of political community are in condition marked by general insecurity, but also by absence of clear normative stance which enable people to reutilize their individual and collective meaning. In the absence of clear orienting points (*theologia civilis*) people are in condition not guided by common good, but instead are motivated by individual drives (passions). Within such irrational passions the fear is strongest one. In canonical treatise *Liberalism of Fear* Judith Shklar make a fear a negative foundation of politics arguing that fear is physiological reaction to violence or

<sup>3</sup> A. Mangui-Pipidi, „The Splintering of Postcommunist Europe”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, No 1, 2015, pp. 88–100.

<sup>4</sup> F. Bieber, „Approaches to Political Violence and Terrorism in Former Yugoslavia 1”, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 5: 1, 2003, pp. 39–51.

<sup>5</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War. The Complete Hobbes Translation*, Chicago University Press, Chicago and London, 1898.

<sup>6</sup> N. Dimitrijević, „Values for Valueless Society: Constitutional Morality after Collective Crime”, in Milan Podunavac (ed.), *State and Democracy*, FPN, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2012.

threat of violence. Fear did not allow for purposive action; it was to „tyrannical a passion” to „involuntary and far too imperious to be controlled”.<sup>7</sup> Fear and diffusion of insecurity and panic became the chief force of individual and collective conduct. In such condition the society regularly slides into disorder, the values of trust and solidarity are destroyed, the tacit social contract that used the shape and integrates the political community stop functioning, and specific form of fear (fear of disorder) replaces all other form of behavior. Nothing marks such conditions of „great fear” so well as situations of large-scale cataclysmic (war, civil wars, populist movements etc). These are situations when people see the institutions previously unifying and integrating society wither away, so to speak before their eyes. The military, justice, the police, the administration and the laws are replaced by terror, violence, invasion, destruction, war without any rules. In the early nineties the political society of Balkan region were going through such situation. Description of such situation can be described in the terms of *armed paranoia*. The people destroy a weak state in fear of others, but are now seeking another and identical state to defend and protect them. In the meantime, fear has made them insecure, violent and lonely. The people of disorder move people to strive for condition of order and security. „This is village war. The men on either side of the front line once were neighbors. The Serbs on guard duty, the most of them tired, middle aged reservist, who much rather would be in bed, all went to school with Croats, just as tired, probably just as middle-aged, in bunker close by. I want to understand how neighbors are turned into enemies, how people who had a lot in common end up having nothing in common but wars. We need to find the story that will explain how communities of interests, a story that will connect collapse of state power, and the rise of nationalist paranoia, down at human level in the place of Mirkovci.<sup>8</sup> Destruction of order and legality in the region of South-East and the nature of „legitimacy struggle” through which this process was evolving is birthplace of political amalgams (regimes of fear) that arisen in the region. Fear and lawlessness is energetic principle of that order. Serbian case is paradigmatic. The process of deinstitutionalization of political and legal order (destruction of legality, diminishing of public liberty, colonization of public arena, private military forces, systematic production of fear) strongly influenced political dynamic of region producing low level of consolidation of rule of law, insecurity, violation of human rights, far right extremism. All of them are enemies of democracy and civil

<sup>7</sup> J. Shklar, „Liberalism of Fear”, in N. I. Rosenblum (ed.), *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, Chicago University Press, Chicago and London, 1987. See also: C. Robin, „Liberalism at Bay, Conservatism at Play: Fear in the Contemporary Imagination”, *Social research*, Vol. 71, No 4, Winter 2004.

<sup>8</sup> M. Ignatieff, *The Warrior Honor. Ethnic war and Modern Conscience*, Metropolitan Book, New York, 1997, p. 34.

society and basic European values. Sum-up shortly: negative legacy of war and destruction of legality during the war produced the low level of consolidation of rule of law and constitutionalization of political power in the region.

Another important elements in analysis political dynamic of South East deals with very specific form of state and nation building, asymmetry and political development and the role of nationalism as most expansive force in the region. As regard this very specific form of state and nation building I would start with formula shaped by Friedrich Meinecke. According to him there are two main patterns in the process of state and nation building in contemporary Europe. First one is captured in the formula of nationalization of state, whereas Meinecke labels the second as process of etatization of nation. It is common assumption that form of state and nation building of northern and Western Europe developed within existing territorial state.<sup>9</sup> On the contrary belated nation in central and eastern Europe developed the other type of that modernizing process. In these societies national consciousness has been anticipated, disseminated by propaganda, and it drafted positions leading toward formation of national state. At the same time, actors of these two different modernizing processes were different. The former is essentially borne by political class, what Weber calls „rational state bureaucracy”, the latter is on the other hand dominantly shaped by political intelligence of these societies. Middle class which is bearer of modernization process is substituted by unenlightened and corrupted political and military class. The territory of South-East belongs to the latter type. In Balkan societies all this yields not only specific kind of asymmetry in political development, but in the same time it established nationalism as strongest and most expansive force in the region. These societies do not recognize that kind of identity between nation and state, which J. Stuart Mill in his treaty on Habsburg Empire, described as necessity that in modern state „border of nation and border of freedom must be identical”.<sup>10</sup> All this causes that in South-European societies Enlightening universalism and liberalism have never gained the role they had in Western part of Europe. Specific kind of division of labor between nationalism and liberalism, in which nationalism is basic form of shaping collective identity, and liberal universalism as form of shaping individual autonomies and rights, and constitutional limitation of political power, in the region never come into life. „Etatization of nation” in the region of South-Europe (Balkan) did not have anything in common with gra-

<sup>9</sup> R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London, 1992. See also: I. Hont, „Permanent Crisis of Divided Mankind: Contemporary Crises of Nation State”, *Political studies*, XLII, 1994, pp. 146–231.

<sup>10</sup> J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Democracy*, J. M. Dent, London, 1960.

dualness and spontaneity described by T. H. Marshal, analyzing the evolution of citizenship and state in modern Europe.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, existence of expansive nationalism even before the establishment of modern state was completed; left open the issues of territorial scope of nation and the fundamental problem who belong to whom. The region is dominated by territorial disputes, migrations, minority or nationality conflict, and corresponding secessionist longings. Denial of Bosniaks from the side of Serbian nationalists and imperial aspiration toward Bosnia („they forgot Serbian origin”) derives exactly from that type of arguments. The absence of identity between border of nation and border of states lead to condition which István Bibó denominates as existential (Hobbesian) fear of communities. „This means that nations living in thus region lacked what was naturally clearly, precisely and concretely present in both everyday life and community consciousness of nation in Western Europe. A reality of their own national and state framework, capital city, harmony between economy and politics, a unified societal elite etc. In Eastern Europe, national framework was constantly, something that had to be created, repaired, fought for, and constantly protected. This situation contributed to the development of the trait most characteristic of unbalanced Central and Eastern Europe political attitudes: an existential fear for one’s community.”<sup>12</sup> At another place Bibó more precisely described that kind of exestantial fear. „Wars about historical and ethnic borders soon accustomed peoples to being each other’s throats as well, and given chance they used on each other the methods they learned from emperors, czar, and sultans. Western Europeans see it as empty phrase when a statement of any eastern European small country speak of ‘the nation death of annihilation’ they can image genocide, oppression, or slow assimilation, but they consider the threat overnight political ‘elimination’ as an exaggerated figure of speech while east Europeans see it as an concrete reality. In the region, it is not necessary to eliminate or forcibly deport nation’s inhabitants in order to evoke a sense a danger; it is enough to forcefully and violently cast doubt upon its very existence.”<sup>13</sup>

### *Statehood*

Claus Offe who described Elster’s theorem as „dilemma of simultaneity” backed to same problem in huge article „Capitalism by de-

<sup>11</sup> T. H. Marshal, „Citizenship and Social Class”, in Bryan S. Turner & Peter Hamilton (eds.), *Citizenship: Critical Concepts*, Routledge, London and N. York, 1994.

<sup>12</sup> I. Bibó, „The Distress of East European Small States”, in Karoly Nagy (ed.), *Democracy, Revolution, Self-Determination*, Columbia Univesity Press, New York, 1991, p. 38.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

mocratic Design? Democratic Theory facing the tripple transition in east central Europe”. He design analytical framework capturing three levels of analyze. First one is level of statehood and identity; second, one is level of rules procedures and rights; and, last one is level of decision and distribution of public goods. „The unique and unprecedented nature of East Central European process of transformation – and the challenge to democratic theory emetging from it – is fully highlighted only if we remind ourselves that any operative poltiical system is the combined outcome of three hierahical levels of decision making. At the most fundamental level a decision must be made at to who ‘we’ are, that is, decision of identity, citizenship and territoriasl as weel as social boundries of nation-state. At the second level, rules, procedures, and right must be established that together make the constitution or institutional framework of the regime. It is only on highest level that those processes and decisions go on that are sometimes mistaken for essence of politics, namely, decision on who gets, what, when and how – in the terms of both poltiical power and economic resources.”<sup>14</sup> Offe started with very common assuption that limited statehood can be defined as main obstacles of democratic and constitutional consolidation of region. There is very common arguments within scholars that the major diffrence between the countries of Central europe and South East is not just time-lag or degger of democratic consolidation but the question of statehood and state capacity.<sup>15</sup> The concept of „minimalist state” understand in the terms of legitimacy, scope of institutions and strenght of state function belongs to that kind of argument.<sup>16</sup> Where the „state of state” has remained precarious it has played a sygnificant part in preventing democratic consolidation. The succes and failure of democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe has been influenced far more by problem of governance than by possible interference through simultaneous poliical and economic transformation. As Linz and Stepan<sup>17</sup> have formulated just how essential a functionig state is: „Without state, there can be no citizenship, without citizenship, there can be no democracy.”<sup>18</sup>

The notion of statehood is another anme for very understanding of governance. In this context governance is undestand in two senses. Firstly, it refers to the ingrity of a „Staatvolk”, national territory

<sup>14</sup> Offe, op. cit.

<sup>15</sup> Rupnik, op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> F. Bieber, „Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkan”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 63, No 10, December 2011, pp. 1783–1802.

<sup>17</sup> J. Linz & A. C. Stepan, *Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*, The John Hopkins, Baltimor and London, 1996, p. 38.

<sup>18</sup> W. Merkel, „Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe”, *International politik und Gesellschaft*, 2008, p. 26.

and state power. Secondly, to administrative capacity of public institutions.<sup>19</sup> Foundation of political order upon constitution requires statehood upon two fundamental grounds. Both of them defines Balkan states in the term of „limited statehood”.

Firstly. Statehood is guarantee of political order. It is true that constitutional norms cannot be applied to chaos, i. e., in situation of disorder and lawlessness in which no authority exist and which could determine what the law is and who is obliged to enforce it effectively. Constitutionalism and rule of law is only viable if order is established by sovereign power beforehand. „There exist no norma that are applicable to chaos. For legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitively decides whether this normal situation actually exist.”<sup>20</sup> Consequently, if we go along with this argument, constitutionalism would not be promising goal for the struggle of deeply divided societies to find an effective way out of their difficulties. In the region of South east constitutionalism was not remedy against ethnic wars. The force that ended the wars was international protectorat following with very specific form of interanational state and nation building. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are paradigmatic cases. The political development in the region abolished the formation of protectorate state in three important ways. Firstly, it open the space for harmonizing the influence of divergent ethnic political forces, secondly, it encourage the space for individual autonomy and human rights, and thirdly, it open space legitimacy of political power and building up political arena outside of dominant form of ethnocracy. Ethnocracy is still dominant form of political order in the region of South East. „Ethnocracy can be understand as a particular type of rule in which power is concentrated in the hands who promote themselves as unique qualified to define and defend the national interests and which the ruled are collectivities defined by common culture, history, religion, myths and presumed descent. In order to create political and cultural landscapes that fit their political strategies and aims, ethnocrats attempt to change the demographic makeup of the community and character of political subjects. Seeking to destroy complex social relations, which might offer resistance to their strategies, they destroy independent social institutions and stunt the development of civic culture.”<sup>21</sup>

Secondly, statehood provides physical and symbolic boundaries which allow the definition which allow the definition of the peo-

<sup>19</sup> A. T. Borzel, „Transformative Power Europe? The EU Promotion in Areas of Limited Statehood”, Paper prepared for ERD Workshop „Transforming Political Structure: Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanism”, Florence, 16–17 April 2009.,

<sup>20</sup> C. Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2005, p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> J. Mostow, *Soft Borders. Rethinking Sovereignty and Democracy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p. 40.

ple to whom constitutive power is ascribed. „The power to make a constitution is power to create a political order *ex nihilo*. In modern terms, constitution means the active making of new order, as opposed to its gradual emergence in the course of continual historical process. Constitution making involves the idea of an authority and the author whose willpower is ultimate cause of the polity.”<sup>22</sup> Uncertainty about who belongs to the people which constitutes itself as „we the people” i. e. as nation, undermines the project of constitutional state from the very beginning. Modern statehood is possible only if citizens are recognized as equal members of state and if recognize authority of state as legitimating. Constitutional identity posits that vertical contract between citizens and state. At the same time citizens must be connected and united by horizontal form of consensus and loyalty recognizing each other as member of same community. Conflict about collective identity exists in deeply divided societies and can be recognized at states which suppress ethnic and religious minorities whose members are subject but not citizens morally entitled to belong to political community and morally entitled to rule in the polity. What recent development in the South East conforms continuity through *limited statehood* can exist even such fundamental issues are not resolved. Although until now the EU transformative power has proved effectively in integrating established states, now it is still confronted with challenge of integrating contested states. It is self-evident that democratic polity required the consensus on its territorial framework and answer who belong to whom. As long as the *issues of border and minorities* following by *contested political memories* chances for democratic and constitutional consolidation of region remained slim. Rather than the possibilities of shifting majorities based on multiple identities, politics of identity and nationalistic pattern of state and nation building in the South East produces expectation of permanent permanent majorities and minorities. A politics of national identity built on such bounds may provide a mechanism for fixing and naturalizing difference and facilitating relations of domination promoting nations of belonging inconsistent with democratic choice. That happened when vulnerable groups find themselves excluded from political rights or protections and the provisions of public goods that ethno/national or religious belonging becomes critical to their survival. In such climate subordination of woman is not accidental but constitutive part of SEE societies. Gender difference (inequality) is in certain way matrix difference that serves to justify all others inequalities and injustice. The entire nationalist warrior’ language is highly sexualized. This is particularly effective wi-

<sup>22</sup> U. Preuss, „Constitutional Powermaking of New Polity: Some Deliberation on the Relation Between Constituent Power and Constitution”, in M. Rosenfeld (ed.), *Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1994, p. 143.



th gendering and naturalizing membership and Citizenship. In the South east there is huge patriarchal consensus around nation of woman as markers of and national culture and territoriality. Woman is encourage to „rediscover” their „natural” an return to family, motherland, and national values, those values that will hold the nation together. A common fate 4 of woman as members of community is that while being held responsible for continuance of nation, they are always suspect, they, they are symbols of the purity of nation but is always vulnerable, they embody homeland but is always potential stranger. Woman who reject their role are traitor, internal „others” or enemies. As woman is urged backed into private life, so are others. „Symbolically, religion, language, and gender and, in particular, proper gender role becomes boundaries in national iconography.”<sup>23</sup> That is part of landscape in which civic culture and its manifestation of plurality must be significantly reduced or removed from public arena. Weak states unable to fulfill basic political goods (security, collective identity, legitimacy, social welfare) are significant problem today for development of democracy and constitutional stability. As regard region political dynamic is not optimistic: Kosovo is on the search for sovereignty and recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in search for post-Dayton constitution; Serbia in search for acceptable borders; Macedonia in search of identity and the name; Montenegro still in the complex process how to reconcile internal dispute over Montenegrin statehood and identity. Both fundamental standards for „good governance” (constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy) are problematic in the region. Sum-up shortly: *limited statehood is followed by low level of rule of law and democratic deficit of political legitimacy of present political regimes.*

### *Rule of Law*

It is common assumption that good governance had increasingly gained prominence in the process of the Europeanization of South East. In the regimes whose statehood is limited that standard is primarily oriented to the promotion of effective government since the major challenge is to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to adopt and enforce political reforms in order to improve governance.<sup>24</sup> Good governance in narrow sense as we started in first pages of paper is associate with setting of sound administrative and regulatory framework mainly provided by state. The core principles of good governance is transparency and efficiency which is translated into sound public policy management or fight against corruption making policies more predicable and effective. The state and its administrative capacities play a crucial role in that pro-

<sup>23</sup> Mostow, op. cit., p. 42.

<sup>24</sup> Borzel, op. cit.

cess. The basic aims are to create regulative environment as decisive precondition for achieving sustainable development. It further aims at the effective and purposeful management of primary economic resources. Rule of law is core for building such stable and predictable framework both for individual and economic actor. As far as sustainable development is concerned, the rule of law is important in setting the framework for „fair games” which will give equal rights to everyone. In the light of this rule of law will encourage individuals and make them feel secure to think of self-employment and will therefore encourage and foster innovation. Credible private-property rights and free exchange create the foundation for the process that encourage individuals to identify, test and select, via voluntary interaction with other individuals, the rules of games for their community. The establishment of effective legal and administrative framework shall ensure the predictability and accountability of political and economic actors. Strengthening the state capacities and rule through and under law build up limitation of government authority and prevent it from acting arbitrarily. In the SEE region all of these standards are to far. The of region of South East is permeated by powerful *anti-legalistic ideologies*. The patterns of these ideologies are varied, from glorifying spontaneous violence as substitute for the morality of law, to different forms of nihilism which see revolution as authentic forms of popular self-reflection, to various forms of anarchism and communarians, which in the name of shared life-forms reject the ethic of law. For the South East such development and legacy entails addressing *low level of consolidation of rule of law* tackling corruption, nepotism, and preference for passing legal norms. That implies dealing with the main source of those phenomena, legacies of socialism (social capita means corrupt network to get around the law), of the war economy (getting around embargoes by cooperating with organized crime), and of the market transition with largely corrupt privatization process. And lastly, the use of public sector for political patronage and state capture.<sup>25</sup> High level corruption is common marks for almost all states. Former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader who helped has been in custody, so Svetozar Marovic from Montenegro including several members of government who also facing corruption trials. On other case individual and property rights insecurity rising up in Serbia (Savamala case etc).

### *Democracy*

Low level of rule of law and destruction of principle of legality is accompanied with huge democratic deficit. Most of countries in the region are a troubled democracy. Trust in institutions is very

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<sup>25</sup> Rupnik, op. cit.

low. Rule of law in many cases is only fiction. Political regimes in the region belong to specific form of *illiberal democracy*. In such kind of regime which Wolfgang Merkel rightly defines as subtype of „Defekte Demokratie” (defect democracy) democratically elected regimes once that has been elected, are ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms? Besides the permanent failures during election process, colonization of public arena, absence of dialogue between government and oppositions, suppressed civil society actor, propaganda and diffusion of fear, the basic feature of those kind of regime is highly personalized form of government. These systems tends to produce strong leaders who believe that they speak for the people using populist political language and backed on fear as energetic principle of government. We are witnessing the lack of commitment to liberal-democratic norms accompanied by tendency of normalization of authoritarian political regimes (Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia). Failing into illiberalism is common sin of many newly emerged democracies in the region.<sup>26</sup> Following James Dawson and Sean Hanley „competitive democratic system whose landscape of institutions are modeled of those of Western Europe are increase undermined by popular distrust; corrupt and collusive relationships linking business, media and political elites; and periodic eruption of civic anger and anti-elite populism. These system are also characterized by a reveling lack of public discussion and civic activism around touchstone social issues, such is treatment of Roma population or LGBT rights, and lack of substantive, informed debate on the political power of economic elite. Such gaps set up de facto limits on the scope of liberal democracy.”<sup>27</sup> Huge protests on street of Skopje, Pristina, and Podgorica overburden by violence and intolerance to other is just symptom of such democracy backsliding. Practices involving politics of newborn fear and manipulating representation of the „others” which have been enacted by far right political groups in the area reinforcing by escalating migration crisis and western Balkan migration route strengthen such negative undemocratic dynamic.

For many reason the Western Balkans ‘The Hour of Europe’ open with Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 which EU emerged as the unchallenged transformative actor in the region is on test. Recent decision of Great Britain to leave ERU after 43 years would encourage of far right groups and influence political landscape of region. For that reason of ERMA as birthplace of modern, European academic and political elites in the region has important and challenged role.

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<sup>26</sup> I. Krastev, „Liberalism’s Failure to Deliver”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 27, No 1, January 2016.

<sup>27</sup> J. Dawson & S. Hanley, „The Fading Mirage of the „Liberal Consensus”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 27, No 1, Januar 2016, pp. 20–30.

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